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GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONSMilitary reservists have become a vital component of Canada’s forces at home and abroad,
and like their counterparts in the regular forces, provide a service for all Canadians. However,
owing to recent federal and provincial job protection legislation, employers of reservists tend
to bear a disproportionate share of the costs when their employees are deployed overseas or
domestically. If reservists choose to take on full-time military duties, their civilian employer’s
search for a temporary replacement worker of equal skill represents a genuine and potentially
significant cost. An unintended consequence of the current policy framework is that
relationships among employers, reservist employees, and the military can be eroded.
Canadian employers of reservists and the Canadian Forces need to work together to restore
and strengthen that relationship, in combination with policy reforms at the federal level.
Given the key roles Canadian reservists play in meeting increasing domestic and international
security demands, policymakers need to rethink who pays for employer costs from the
temporary loss of an employee and how this, in turn, affects a reservist’s smooth transition
away from – and back to – civilian life. 
This Backgrounder urges financial assistance for employers who incur costs by protecting the
jobs of reservists who choose to serve full-time in the military. Such a program would target
the provision of higher levels of benefits to firms likely to suffer disproportionately from the
loss of an employee, therefore shifting the costs of some military operations from a few
employers to all taxpayers, but at a low price. A Canadian system of financial assistance for
employers would more equitably distribute the costs of national defence actions that benefit
all Canadians, and be fair to the general public.
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M
ilitary reservists today are
more than just strategic
reinforcements to enhance
readiness in time of conflict. Indeed,
they have assumed key roles in both
domestic and international operations,
especially in Afghanistan. Canada
currently rotates about 2,500 soldiers in
that country, mostly in the Kandahar
region, and some 20 percent of these
servicemen and women are reservists.
Canada has approximately 66,000 regular force
members and 26,000 reservists. By maintaining pools
of potential soldiers in peacetime, military planners can
save on institutional and overhead costs. Given the
demands on the regular forces, the military has reacted
to increasing operational demands, both domestic and
international, as well as the coming Winter Olympics’
security requirements, with unprecedented use of the
reserves, making their availability an essential
component to operational success.
Clearly, the use of reservists in military operations
promotes the peace, security and prosperity of all
Canadians. These are commonly known as “public
good” characteristics and underpin the general case
for publicly provided and financed military forces. 
Employers of reservists tend to bear the risk or the
costs of having their employees deployed overseas,
owing to federal and provincial job protection legisla-
tion. Since a large percentage of reservists – historically
around 40 percent – attend school or postsecondary
institutions,2 such legislation affects those in the
remaining 60 percent who hold civilian positions. 
Overall, only a small proportion of Canadian
businesses hire reservists. As a result, few individuals
or companies have an incentive to share in the
burden of job protection costs, even though they all
benefit from increased security. Hence, job
protection legislation singles out the employers of
reservists to incur disproportionate costs for society’s
benefit from reservist operations.
The employer’s obligation to protect the job of a
reservist has parallels with other mandated
workplace requirements where the costs of social
obligations are transferred onto employers who
employ specific groups. Examples are maternity
leave job protection, leave for jury duty, and the
requirement to accommodate the disabled in the
workplace. In the case of maternity leave, the
number of employers who hire women of a fertile
age is relatively diffuse, thus spreading out the costs
of this obligation. In the other cases, such as jury
duty, a select few employers are required to bear the
burden of the costs of activities that society believes
are worthwhile. The question then arises as to
whether society at large ought to share at least some
of the costs of accommodating special classes of
workers, rather than them being borne in the main
by particular employers.
While reservists bring important skills to their
jobs, employers may nonetheless be reluctant to hire
reservists because of the costs of long absences.
Without the confidence and support of their
employers, reservists may choose to leave military
service or try to keep secret their volunteer
activities.3 Neither of these outcomes is desirable. 
Although reservist job protection laws – formally
proposed in the 1995 Special Commission on the
Restructuring of the Reserves – are intended to
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I would like to thank the following individuals with experience in Canadian reservist policy who provided feedback on previous iterations of this
paper. They are: Blake Goldring, Valerie Keyes, Adam McLeod, Maj.-Gen David Fraser, Jack Granatstein, Brian MacDonald, Brig.-Gen, Larry
O’Brien, Chris Madsen, Morley Gunderson, Johan Carignan, Susanna Cluff-Clyburne, John Dolbec, and Finn Poschmann. The paper also
benefited from discussions at the October 27, 2009 Reservists Conference at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto. All errors and opinions in the
paper are those of the author. 
1 The total force concept is a policy, introduced by many nations in the 1970s, that treats components of the military such as the regular forces
and reserves as a single unit. Canada’s 1994 Defence White Paper, “Security in a Changing World,” highlighted Canada’s commitment to this
concept while raising concerns over response capabilities in case of mobilization.
2 Federal reforms in Bill C-40 in 2008 amended the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act and The Canada Student Loans Act to protect full-
time student reservists who deploy against accumulating interest on their student loans and to protect their active student status. There is also
similar student-specific legislation enacted in some jurisdictions. 
3 Attrition issues are particularly relevant to the reserves – a typical reserve career is roughly three to five years whereas a regular force career is
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support a reservist’s choice to volunteer for military
deployment, these laws shift the costs of military
activities to individual employers, potentially
causing hiring discrimination that, in turn, raises
doubt about the effectiveness of these laws. 
This Backgrounder urges financial assistance for
employers who incur costs by protecting the jobs of
reservists who choose to serve full-time in the military.
It addresses issues surrounding a reservist’s decision to
volunteer for military deployment and examines
policy options that would ease the costs of job
protection legislation directly incurred by employers. 
To better align employer interests with the
greater public interest, a more comprehensive
reservist policy in Canada would see the creation of
simple, and reasonably inexpensive, employer-based
financial compensation packages for operational
leave. Following international examples, Canada
would benefit from such an approach by covering
the burden of losing workers temporarily, better
supporting deployment decisions and better
assisting a reservist’s transition back to civilian life.
Such a program would target higher levels of
benefits to firms likely to suffer disproportionately
from the loss of an employee, therefore shifting the
costs of some military operations from a few
employers to all taxpayers, but at a low price. 
A Reservist’s Choice
Under almost all circumstances, Canadian reservists
have the choice to activate – to take on a larger
military role and temporarily remove themselves
from civilian life. Involuntary service occurs only in
a state of emergency, which is defined in the
National Defence Act as “an insurrection, riot,
invasion, armed conflict or war, real or
apprehended.”4
There are three classes of reservists: Class A
(traditional part-time), Class B (full-time), and
Class C (full-time deployed).5 Each class performs a
range of military duties, from exercises and courses
to international operations.6 For most international
deployments, reservists need extra training to raise
their capabilities to the level of the regular forces.7
In the current Afghanistan mission, the period of
reservist service consists of three distinct phases:
pre-deployment training (three to seven months),
operational tour (six to 12 months) and post-tour
leave (one to two months).8The total length of
active duty ranges from 14 to 21 months (O’Brien
2008). Clearly, such long periods of active duty
may complicate the transition back to civilian life. 
New entrants to the labour force, or those who
are enrolled in post-secondary institutions, may
find opportunities for higher earning, adventure
and service to the nation by volunteering for full-
time duty as opposed to remaining in civilian life.9
In contract, those who have been working in
civilian jobs may have stronger ties to the labour
force, family responsibilities and may receive a
higher salary than that offered in full-time military
service. This is the trade-off faced by individual
reservists, who must weigh the national, personal
and financial benefits of military service against the
financial costs and the risks of death or injury. 
Increasing demand for Canadian reservists has
led to a proliferation of federal and provincial job
protection laws (Table 1). For reservists to qualify
for job protection, they must provide acceptable
notice to their employer of their decision to take on
full-time military duties. Reservists must also have
C.D. Howe Institute
4 Section 33(2) of the National Defence Act says that should a state of emergency be declared, a government with the advice of Cabinet may call
reservists into active service by passing legislation through an order-in-council, forgoing the normal legislative procedure. However, the legislation
must be signed by the Governor General before it can be enacted.
5 See Park (2008) for a more detailed explanation of different reserve functions and activities. In terms of compensation, Class A and B reserve forces are
paid roughly 85 percent of regular force pay when serving full-time or part-time duties; Class C reservists earn pay equal to regular force members.
6 CFLC (2005) lists the different types of military leave for reservists.
7 Only in rare circumstances would reservists not need additional training for deployment. Among the exceptions are doctors, nurses and engineers.
8 The military purpose for post-tour leave is mainly to gradually reintegrate soldiers with society and their families – reducing the psychological
impact of operational work – and to monitor their medical condition. With the current mission in Afghanistan, Canadian soldiers also spend a few
days in Cyprus before returning to Canada. 
9 See Appendix B of Klerman (2008) for a formal model on reserve compensation and deployment decisions in the US context. J Ju ur ri is sd di ic ct ti io on n F Fe ed de er ra al l N NL L P PE EI I N NS S N NB B Q QC C O ON N
Eligibility Notice (weeks)
Public Sector 0 8 as soon as practical 12 as soon as practical 4 as soon as practical
Private Sector 4 8 same as above 12 same as above 4 same as above
Special Conditions






none Only for Class C
service










Private Sector Leave can be refused if
causes undue hardship to
employer or affects
public health or safety
same as above none same as above same as above same as above same as above
Minimum Period of Civilian Employment (months)
Public Sector 0 6 6 12 6 12 (overseas only) 6
Private Sector 6 6 6 12 6 12 (overseas only) 6
Duration
(months)
0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ (with 12-
month break )
0 to 24+ max of 18 in 36-
month period
0 to 18 (with 12-
month break)






0 0000 0 0
Compensation Policies
Employer No No No No No No No
Employee No No No No No No No
J Ju ur ri is sd di ic ct ti io on n M MB B S SK K A AB B B BC C Y YK K U US S    U UK K    A AU US S   ( (f fe ed de er ra al l) )
Eligibility Notice (weeks)
Public Sector as soon as
practical
none 4 4 4 none, as soon as
practical
as soon as practical as soon as
practical
Private Sector same as above none 4 4 4 same as above same as above same as above
Special Conditions








Leave can be refused if
causes undue hardship
to employer or affects
public health or safety
Employer may apply
for exemption due 
to undue hardship
Employer may apply
for exemption due 
to undue hardship
None
Private Sector none none same as above same as above same as above same as above same as above None
Minimum Period of Civilian Employment (months)
Public Sector  7 0 6.5 0 6 0 0 0
Private Sector 7 0 6.5 0 6 0 0 0
Duration
(months)
0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ 0 to 24+ not specified not specified 
Return to work
notice (weeks)
0 0 4 0 0 ranges from 0 to 12
weeks depending on
length of service




Employer No No No No No No Yes Yes
Employee No No No No No Yes Yes No
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Table 1: Re-instatement Leave Legislative Guidelines, Canada and Abroad
Source: DND (2009b); various sources. | 4 Backgrounder 123
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worked a minimum amount of time, depending on
the jurisdiction, in either the public or private
sectors to qualify for job protection. The operations
for which employees may qualify for job-protected
leave also vary by jurisdiction, although most
provinces cover Class C overseas missions. 
Some legislation also includes a “hardship
clause,” which permits employers to deny a request
for military leave if they can provide proof that
doing so would materially damage their business.
Further, some jurisdictions place limits on the
frequency of job-protected leave by requiring a
break between periods of deployment. 
Upon return to work, employees have the right
to be reinstated to the position occupied before the
leave. If this is not possible for a valid reason,
employees must be reinstated to a comparable
position of similar wages and benefits. A company
is not obliged to pay a reservist’s salary or benefits
while he/she is deployed. 
Costs to Employers and Potential
Consequences
Employers are a key link between the civilian life of
a reservist and his/her military duties. They benefit
from hiring reservists through the practical skills
that reservists learn in training, such as teamwork,
managerial and communication skills. Yet despite
this obvious upside, once employers hire a reservist,
they must also assume the risks that come with it. 
For reservists, voluntary, as opposed to
compulsory, call-up creates another problem:
should a reservist choose temporarily to depart
from an employer – essentially choosing military
activities over civilian ones – the employment
relationship could be harmed.10 Some firms may
attempt to avoid the problem entirely by not hiring
reservists, hindering the reservist’s employment
prospects. Given the range of possible employer
responses, another potential consequence of job-
protection legislation may lead to shifting the
deployment risk onto employees in the form of
lower wages. 11
In the case of military deployment, an employer
will likely need to hire someone else to perform
the reservist’s lost work time, or increase the
workload of existing employees.12 Output may
fall, productivity may decline and the search costs
for a new employee may be substantial. The
obligation to reinstate a reservist after many
months of leave may also require retraining costs.
By extension, this may put any firm employing
reservists, large or small, at a competitive
disadvantage. 
Evidence from a U.S. Congressional Budget
Office study reveals that among the six percent of
all American businesses that hire reservists, the
ability to cope with the loss of an employee varies
substantially. Small businesses and businesses that
require workers with highly specialized skills often
suffer significantly and in rare cases partially shut
down when these employees are lost to reserve duty.
Larger firms, on the other hand, also experience
disruptions but are generally more able to absorb
lost employee hours with a limited slowdown in
production or additional expenses (CBO 2005). 
10 In the case of students, postsecondary institutions could lose tuition fees as a result of a student leaving a restricted program. The concern here is
that schools could discriminate against the readmission or acceptance of reservists. Although schools could lose a source of income, a student
leaving an educational institution does not pose any obvious operational costs: teachers will not need to teach more, and students will not need to
study more. This blurs any policy need.
11 Empirical evidence on US employer responses to the costs of legislated accommodation requirements, such as the protection offered to disabled
citizens under the, Americans with Disabilities Act, shows significant adverse affects to the hiring of people with disabilities that, contrary to the
legislation’s intent, made them less employable (see Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). There is also evidence that the costs of accommodation
requirements get shifted back to workers in terms of lower wages.
12 A large proportion of Canadian reservists – historically about 40 percent – are students at postsecondary institutions or secondary schools. For
these reservists, the decision to activate may come at the expense of losing a place in their program or losing credits for courses taken (CFLC 2006).
Most universities today, however, accommodate their reservist students to the greatest extent possible, within the limitations imposed by program
demands, availability of instructors, etc.Backgrounder 123 | 5
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Canada’s Growing Military Need for
Reservists
The majority – around 15,000 – Canada’s 26,000
reservists are in the part-time, non-deployed
category.13They serve across five major elements:
the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air Reserve,
Health Services Reserve and Reserve Legal Services
(Table 2A). Reservists are proportionally younger
than the regular forces – more than 40 percent of
reservists are aged 25 and under – and they tend to
concentrate more in combat arms and operations
(Table 2B). By maintaining a pool of potential
soldiers in peacetime, military planners can plan for
cost efficiencies with a mix of reserve and regular
force personnel.
Given that the regular forces are hard-pressed to
meet all their commitments, the military has reacted
to increasing operational demands by making
significant use of the reserves (Granatstein and
Belzile 2005). As of late 2009, over 3,000 reservists
have served in Afghanistan since the start of the
mission. 
Canada’s future security realities and personnel
needs are broadly outlined in the Canada First
Defence Strategy (DND 2009a). In it, the size of the
reserves is expected to grow to about 30,000 over 20
years. Meanwhile, the demographic age group that
normally produces reservists is expected to decline as
a proportion of the total workforce population over
the next decade (see Figure 1).14The Canadian
Forces shares – and to some extent compete for –
reservist personnel with many domestic employers,
such as local police forces, fire departments and
paramedic services, among others. Critical to the
future capacity of the reserves is the ability to retain
personnel, an issue dependent on the cooperation
and good faith of civilian employers. 
Employer Support Program Options
As noted, a cost burden falls on the few Canadian
employers who hire reservists. This can have a
ripple effect on a reservist’s ability to find
employment, smoothly return to civilian work, or
even remain in the reserve forces. The Canadian
Forces’ current desire to rely on the reserves more
than in the past, and to do so in the very near
future, means that the immediate risks and
potential losses for public- and private-sector
employers are growing. 
Although a small fraction of Canadian firms
extend support to their reservist employees without
reimbursement,15 shifting reservists’ deployment
costs onto government would better foster a
reservist’s relationship with an employer and protect
the role of reservists in Canadian society. 
13 This is the figure for the effective “paid-strength” size of the primary reserves. Because of the part-time nature of reserve service, not all of Canada’s
35,000 primary reserve personnel will be working on any given day; hence, the figure most often referred to is the reserves paid-strength size.
Students make up about 12,000 of this total figure.
14 I note as well that this age group will be increasingly composed of visible minorities, a traditionally under-represented group in the Canadian forces.
15 This refers to the few Canadian employers that have included support for reservists as part of the company’s human resources policy. See
www.cflc.forces.gc.ca for more. 
Regular Forces Reserves Total Forces Percent Reserves
Army 33,475 18,429 51,903 36%
Navy 11,381 3,817 15,199 25%
Air Force 20,085 2,501 22,586 11%
Other 2,008 1,580 3,588 44%
Total 66,949 26,327 93,276 28%
Table 2A: Personnel Issues: Reservists and Total Force Strength, 2009
Note: The author’s calculations here are meant to reflect the environment in which regular and reserve forces serve (land, air and sea) as reported in Park
(2008). Officially, it is uncommon for the Canadian Forces to aggregate its units - of which there are 30 component capabilities - into the above 3 categories
because not all of the components report directly to the Army, Navy, or Air Force.
Source: CANSIM; Park (2008); DND (2009c); Author’s calculations.Any potential reforms must consider the impact
on: i) an individual’s decision to become a reservist; ii)
an employer’s decision to hire reservists; and iii) the
reservist’s decision to volunteer for military deploy-
ment. When considering these factors, it is clear that
other countries are more progressive than Canada.
Approaches Abroad: Australia and the UK
With a similar reliance on reservist personnel as in
Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia offer
employer compensation programs (Table 3) in
addition to job protection legislation (see Table 1).
While these programs reduce employer losses
associated with reservist service within easily
understood frameworks, they differ in important
ways. Whereas Australia provides one stream of
weekly compensation to employers, the UK
effectively has three different compensation
packages: one to assist employers with the hiring
costs of finding a new employee; a second to cover
overtime costs as a consequence of the employee’s
absence; and a third to compensate employers for
any retraining necessary upon the reservist’s return. 
Both international examples have advantages and
disadvantages. The Australian system of employer
supports, established in 2001, does not require
employers to release much sensitive information,
making the application and approval process
relatively easy. Yet the level of compensation to all
employers is the same, regardless of the actual costs
| 6 Backgrounder 123
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Regular Forces Reserves Civilian Workforce
(%) (%) (%)
Sex
Men 87.8 79.2 53.3
Women 12.2 20.8 46.7
Age
15 to 24 9.9 42.1 19.3
25 to 39 57.7 37.4 33.3
40 to 54 32.0 19.2 36.6
55 to 64 0.4 1.3 10.7
Education
Less than high school 7.1 4.3 13.3
High school diploma 31.4 15.2 19.5
Some postsecondary 13.1 11.0 6.6
Postsecondary degree/diploma 48.2 69.4 59.6
Visible Minority 4.5 11.1 17.1
Occupation (% of regular forces) (% of reserves)
Combat arms 22.2 46.1
Maritime (incl. communications and technical) 12.4 8.6




All other 17.2 13.1
Table 2B: Personnel Issues: Characteristics of Canada's Reservists and Regular Forces, 2008
Source: From Park (2008).Backgrounder 123 | 7
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incurred.16 On the downside, this tends to make
the compensation unrelated to firm-specific factors.
For instance, some firms may not even want to
replace a reservist while he/she is activated, making
government assistance for them largely unnecessary. 
In the UK, a system of financial assistance has
been in place since 1997. Companies can, without
financial limits, claim one-off costs, such as
recruiting agency fees for replacement and
advertising costs. Recurring expenses, such as the
overtime costs of other employees and temporary
replacement fees, can be claimed up to about $200
per day per lost employee. And additional training
costs, above and beyond what is normally required
in relation to the activation period, can be claimed
upon a reservist’s return, without limit. Though the
advantage of the UK assistance package is that it
attempts to tailor the size of benefits to costs,
isolating the total costs in terms of lost output,
productivity and additional expenses from the loss
of an individual employee is a nearly impossible
task (CBO 2005). As well, trying to determine such
costs places a burden on both the administrative
body and the employer – and may encourage
fraudulent claims. 
The United States, perhaps owing to a reliance
on job protection laws and an emphasis on patriotic
spirit among employers, does not offer a program
of employer supports.17
What to Do?
Canadian reservists, their employers and the general
public would benefit by adopting a hybrid of the
above compensation schemes. From the perspective
of simplicity and administrative ease, a financial
support program should limit the administrative
burden for both employers and administrators (UK
16 Employer assistance is awarded at the average weekly full-time adult, ordinary-time earnings as determined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Employers who claim that the weekly levels of payments are insufficient may apply for more.































































ages 15-24, both sexes (left axis) ages 15-24, both sexes, percent of total workforce (right axis)
Figure 1: Key Reservist Demographics, Past and Future
Sources: CANSIM; Author’s calculations.| 8 Backgrounder 123
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Table 3: Varied Employer Compensation Programs
* special hardship can result in larger compensation.
Source: Various government documents.
UK






One-off (i.e., recruiting fees, advertising
costs, admin. costs for claim)
FT/PT 4 none
Recurring (i.e., overtime costs) FT/PT 4 $200 per day
Retraining (i.e., additional retraining
costs from activation)
FT/PT 8
Self-employed (can claim for employer
supports as well as employee supports)
NA same as  above  same as  above
Special Hardship for Employers FT/PT 4 NA
Australia
General Employer Support Payments  FT/PT 24 $1,102 per week* up to 78 weeks;
updated annually; PT prorated
Self-employed reservist can claim for
employer supports
NA 24 same as above
Time (months)
Eligibility Notice as soon as practical
Minimum Period of Civilian Employment (consecutive) 1
Duration 0 to 16
Time to File Claim 6
Claim Approval Period 1
Restrictions FT/PT prorated
Service Type Class B or C
Benefit Types and Levels
General Claims
Based on employee's tax return and size of firm
Firm size (employees) Percentage of annual salary
100+ 40%
20 to 99 50%
10 to 19 60%
5 to 9 70%
1 to 5 80%
max claim of 
$47,200 annually
special hardship can also be claimed
Table 4: A Canadian Employer Compensation Program
Source: Author’s calculations.Backgrounder 123 | 9
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18 This assumption reduces the level of reservists that would qualify under this program by estimating that 50 percent of all deployed reservists are
students or recent graduates without civilian employment – an approximation well supported by commentators on this paper. 
19 The author would like to thank Johan Carignan for supplying reservist deployment data. 
20 This employment rate projection is slightly above actual figures for the Canadian population aged 25 and up. 
MOD 2004). And although it is unclear which
international example is the more expensive of the
two above, the UK program’s attempts to limit
costs should be incorporated in a Canadian context. 
A Canadian Compensation Program
for Employers of Reservists 
Any Canadian compensation program for
employers of reservists should be administered by
the Department of National Defence so that it can
reflect informed military personnel choices. The
administration of the program could feed into
human resource decisions. Both public- and
private-sector employers should be able to claim
financial compensation and use the money for
whatever purposes they deem suitable. 
Benefits would be based on compensation 
levels obtained from employer payroll data. The
implication is that a reservist’s wage is a reasonable
estimate of disruption costs; i.e., a high salary
implies high productivity and thus high disruption
costs. Should an employee not have worked the full
12 months prior to the end of the tax year, earnings
could be prorated, thereby covering full- and part-
time employees. Importantly, benefits would extend
more support to smaller firms that are less likely to
absorb employee losses. Compensation would be
capped at a maximum of 80 percent of a reservist’s
annual salary with the annual ceiling set at the
yearly maximum pensionable earnings – $47,200
per year in 2010. However, there could be a special
hardship exemption (see Table 4).
Who Qualifies?
For a private or public employer to qualify for these
payments, the employee would have to be on either
Class B or C service for more than 30 days. Claims
would be submitted within a fixed period, such as
within six months from the first day of the
employee’s new military duties. Benefits would be
paid for a maximum period of 16 months, which
includes pre- and post-deployment obligations, and
claims could potentially be made for longer periods
as a result of injury or illness experienced during
the employee’s defence service. 
The main challenge with setting qualification
rules is designing them to work within the myriad
of standards under federal and provincial job
protection laws. One solution is to set national
qualification criteria that roughly correspond to the
minimum requirements of the least stringent
provincial or federal legislation. Using this approach,
a reservist would need, say, one month of civilian
employment in order for his/her employer to
receive benefits for up to 16 months. 
Two outcomes are possible under these rules: one
where an employee qualifies under job protection
legislation and his/her employer can now qualify
for benefits, and a second where an employee does
not qualify under job protection legislation but
his/her employer still might receive benefits. In the
case of the latter, an employer would have to agree
to protect the job of his/her employee as if they
were covered under the job reinstatement laws. 
What are the Benefits and Costs? 
Although data do not exist to accurately cost out
this proposed program, I base my calculations first
on the assumption that students are slightly more
likely to deploy than other reservists,18 given what
is known about reserves force activation, pre-
deployment and deployment length.19 I further
assume that 70 percent of all non-student reservists
are employed,20 earning an average weekly wage of
$821, and that all employers of these reservists
qualify for benefits up to a cap of 16 months. 
Under these conditions, I estimate this program
would have cost some $7 million in 2006, $19
million in 2007, $21 million in 2008, and about
$19 million in 2009. Looking ahead, costs can be
estimated based on future deployment levels.21 A full-time administrative staff of 10 to 15 people would cost in the range of $1.3 million annually at average salaries and benefits. 
| 10 Backgrounder 123
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Annual costs should be roughly $26 million in
2010 and roughly $8 million in 2011. 
Such a program would help employers by lowering
their competitive losses. As a result, employers
would lend more support to the decisions of their
employee-reservists, thus improving their civilian
working conditions. Such a program of employer
compensation that targets higher levels of support
to firms generally less able to cope with losses can
also be cost-effective for taxpayers, because benefit
levels would fluctuate with firm size – shrinking for
large companies and expanding for smaller ones. 
With a better understanding of true reservist
costs, military planners can achieve more informed
personnel decisions, minimizing the level of
resources diverted from the civilian workforce. An
improved mix of policies to support the reserve
force would also ensure that the realities of distant
military engagements continue to be transmitted to
communities across Canada.
Other Issues
More administrative capacity and technical
requirements would be necessary to extend the
coverage of employer supports to self-employed
reservists. Today, about one in six people in the
Canadian labour force are self-employed. In the
UK and Australia, the self-employed are covered. 
In each case, legitimate business tests must
demonstrate that an active business is the principal
source of income. Although the self-employed
compose a large fraction of Canada’s workforce,
which is an argument to extend benefits to cover
them, the voluntary nature of deployment in
Canada complicates the case for benefits.
Individuals with personal capital invested in their
business, as both employee and employer, would 
in most cases be less likely to volunteer for
deployment than others, raising doubt as to
whether self-employed individuals are a good
match for the needs of the Canadian Reserves.
Administrative costs, though difficult to quantify,
can be kept in check by a simple application
process.21 Also, the burden of information to
qualify for supports should not rest only with the
employer: reservists should be required to notify
their employers of the program and its implications
in case of activation, thereby ensuring employers are
aware of what is necessary to qualify. This would
facilitate an open and cooperative relationship.
Opponents to reform argue that because the
current system of policies ensures that reservists
who deploy can expect, by law, to come back to a
job, deployment decisions are already supported
without cost to the taxpayer. This is a common
position with policies that provide diffuse benefits
with narrow costs – there is no incentive for those
who benefit to pay if others are bearing the cost.
While recruitment and deployment decisions may
not appear to be an issue today, there is strong
reason to believe that this will not always be the
case, owing to increasing military needs and
domestic demographic change. And as long as some
employers of reservists struggle to absorb the costs
of losing an employee, the employer relationship
with reservists – and ultimately the Canadian
military – risks breaking down. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Canadian employers and the Canadian Forces need
to work together to keep reservists engaged and to
develop their potential for the benefit of all three
parties. Given increasing security demands,
policymakers need to rethink employer costs from
the temporary loss of an employee and how this, in
turn, affects a reservist’s smooth transition away
from – and back to – civilian life. 
Skilled reservists must balance obligations to two
employers. Should they choose to take on full-time
military duties, their civilian employer’s search for 
a temporary replacement worker of equal skill
represents a genuine and potentially significant
cost. Though civilian employers of reservists gain
from the skills reservists learn from military duties,
job-protection legislation shifts a significant portion
of military operations’ personnel costs to a reservist’sBackgrounder 123 | 11
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employer. The unintended consequence of the
current framework is that employer-employee
relationships may erode. And the cost of using
reservists, from the perspective of the Department of
National Defence, is artificially low, which may
cause an overuse of reserves versus regular forces. 
A more robust system of employer supports would
ensure a proper balance of interests among reservists,
civilian employers and the Canadian Forces. 
A Canadian system of financial assistance for
employers would minimize the risks of reservists
facing employer hostility. It would also more
equitably distribute the costs of national defence
actions that benefit all Canadians. Extending
financial assistance to employers of reservists is fair
to both employers and the general public. | 12 Backgrounder 123
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